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ABSTRACT  
Project managers’ behavior has been found to positively influence project outcomes we explore the issue through 
the development of a two-stage model incorporating agency theory that examines the relationship between PM 
behavior and IS project success.  We measure project success by delivery on time, within budget, and adhering to 
specification.  A web-based survey was used to collect data and test the model using SEM. The two-stage model was 
supported, however, further analysis suggests that a combination of three factors commitment, willingness, and 
motivation would significantly improve the model fit by forming a higher-order factor we call drive. We found that 
PM’s participation level is the most important factor influencing project success and is directly influenced by 
incentives and drive.   
Keywords 
Incentives, Project Management, Information Systems, Agency Theory, Success, Performance, Motivation, 
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INTRODUCTION 
Critical to the future success of business activities and initiatives are information systems (IS) designed to meet the 
challenges of today’s and tomorrow’s business environment (Ba et al., 2001).  As a result organizations continue to 
make large investments in and devote substantial resources to IS that are intended to deliver significant performance 
gains (Yetton et al., 2000). The major organizational benefits from successful IS projects will be reflected in: 1) 
reduction of costs associated with IS projects, 2) improvement of organizations’ return on investment (ROI), 3) 
timely implementation of planned functionality, and 4) delivery of functionality designed to meet the needs.  
IS project problems such as failures and overruns continue to exist and have changed little over the past three 
decades  (IT Cortex, 2003; KPMG, 2003). To address these issues we draw our attention to project managers. Jiang 
et al. (2001) found the project manager role was critical for IS project success. Eisenhardt (1989) suggests linking 
performance to incentives as a way to improve project managers’ performance.  
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We therefore explore the relationship between IS project managers and IS project outcomes by examining how the 
use of incentives in the project manager arena can improve the IS project success. We incorporate the work of 
Martisons and Chong (1999), and Yetton et al. (2000) and seek to answer the following research questions: 
(1) What aspects of project managers’ behavior are influenced by the use of incentives?  
(2) What influence does that behavior have on the criteria for successful IS project outcomes?  
We address our research questions by employing agency theory (AT) to examine incentives’ influence on project 
managers’ (PM) behavior. We develop a research model that relates the use of incentives to PM behavior and the 
impact of their behavior on IS project outcomes.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we present the background of the study. Second, we 
develop the research model and propositions. Third, we present the research methodology employed. Fourth, we 
present the data analysis..Fifth, we discuss the research findings. Sixth, we present the contributions and limitations 
of this study, and highlight further research.  
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY  
To address our research questions and develop an agency-based research model, we; 1) identify the factors leading 
to and criteria for IS project success; 2) understand the role of project managers in IS projects; and 3) understand the 
role of AT in improving current practices in IS projects.  
Criteria for IS Project Success  
Technical factors and the role of user’s involvement in IS projects have been established among the most important 
factors influencing the IS development (Barki and Hartwick, 1994b). Further, problems in IS projects are linked to 
social, conceptual, or organizational factors such as, motivation, commitment, involvement, communication, and 
good project management (Guthrie and Hollensbe, 2004; Kim and Peterson, 2000; Shoniregun, 2004; Walsh and 
Schneider, 2002).   
From existing literature, we found that time, cost, and adherence to specifications are the most cited performance 
criteria relevant to IS project success (KMPG 2003). Consistent with Banker and Kemerer’s (1992) model for IS 
performance , we consider a “successful” IS project, a project delivered on time, within budget, and adhering to 
specifications.   
Project Manager Role in IS Projects 
Sound project management is essential to ensure greater probability of IS project success (Shoniregun, 2004). Jiang 
et al. (2001) highlight the important role of PM in IS projects and suggest that PM’s performance has a direct 
relationship with the project outcomes. Shoniregun (2004) suggests PMs should rely more on their personal skills 
involvement rather than on automated project management tools. Therefore, we suggest that ways to improve the 
PM’s contribution to project outcomes is through their personal skills and behavior.  
Agency Theory  
In recent years AT has emerged as a main theory guiding research on the pay-performance relationship (Eisenhardt, 
1989). AT explains how to best organize a relationship in which one party (the principal) directs the work of another 
party (the agent). 
AT argues that problems arise in an agency relationship when: 1) the desires or goals of the principal and agent are 
in conflict and 2) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. AT addresses 
these problems via contracts that provide incentives to agents with the purpose of motivating them to exert effort in 
directions that are aligned with the interests of the principals (McKenzie and Lee, 1998).  
Agency Theory in IS Projects 
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In IS projects, Banker and Kemerer (1992) advocate that agency relationship consists of: 1) the owner of the project 
(the principal) who is concerned with the successful delivery of the IS project, and 2) the PM (the agent) who is 
responsible for the management of IS project. Mahaney and Lederer (2003) suggest that by introducing incentive 
contracts, PMs will give more attention and effort to controlling and monitoring the IS projects, hence they can 
contribute to a lower failure rate of IS projects. Provided that incentives are aligned positively with successful 
project outcomes it is likely the provision of incentives will result in a greater likelihood of project success (Sharma 
and Yetton, 2003).  
RESEARCH MODEL AND PROPOSITIONS 
We examined the behavioral literature and choose four factors of PM’s behavior for inclusion in our research model 
(see Figure 1): commitment, willingness to act, motivation toward, and participation in IS project tasks.  
We believe that AT explains how incentives are most likely to influence the PM’s behavior, which in turn is likely 
to impact the IS project outcomes. Although, AT and use of incentives were addressed in the arena of employees in 
general, we extrapolate their use to PMs because we view PMs as a type of employee.   
 
Figure 1. Agency-Based Research Model 
 
Commitment and Willingness to Act 
Butler and Fitzgerald (2001) propose that management commitment and willingness to act on project activities are 
among the key factors that impact on project success. Because these two factors are likely to influence work related 
performance, we include commitment and willingness to act as factors that might have a positive effect on project 
outcomes.  
Commitment 
Commitment can be defined as the sense of loyalty to an organization or a project (Jurison, 1999). Committed 
employees are willing to devote more of their time and energy to the project; hence a greater desire to contribute to 
the project success. Organizations seek to create committed employees by implementing incentive contracts 
(Moorman et al., 1998). Employees who benefit financially, will be more committed to the organization or project 
they work on (Klein et al., 2001). Therefore, we propose that: 
Proposition 1a: Higher levels of incentives will lead to higher level of PM’s commitment toward an IS 
project. 
Raduescu et al.                                                                                The Influence of Incentives on Project Managers’ Drive and 
Participation 
 
eProceedings of the 3rd International Research Workshop on Information Technology Project Management (IRWITPM), Paris, 
France, December 12th– 13th, 2008 
 
Commitment to an IS project is an important factor in its successful completion (Mahaney and Lederer, 1999). 
Further, committed employees have a greater desire: 1) to perform better on their job, and 2) to do what is right for 
their organization or project  (Klein et al., 2001). Therefore, we propose that: 
Proposition 1b:  Higher levels of PM’s commitment toward an IS project will lead to more successful IS 
project outcomes. 
Willingness to Act 
Employees that are identified with organizational goals or projects show a greater willingness to act and contribute 
meaningfully to the organization or project, thus performing better on the job (Moorman et al., 1998). Organizations 
develop and maintain employees’ attachment to a project and goals by rewarding them via incentive contracts 
(Moorman et al., 1998). We therefore propose that:  
Proposition 2a: Higher levels of incentives will lead to a higher level of PM’s willingness to act toward the 
activities related to an IS project. 
Given the critical role in managing IS projects, PMs are expected to act positively on activities that affect the 
success or failure of an IS project. We therefore propose that: 
Proposition 2b: Higher levels of PM’s willingness to act on activities that affect the success or failure of 
an IS project will lead to more successful IS project outcomes. 
Motivation 
Rasch and Tosi (1992) found motivation was an important factor in predicting software project staff performance. 
Motivated employees are expected to perform better in their jobs, hence we include motivation as a factor that will 
have a positive effect on project outcomes. 
Organizations focus on creating favorable conditions that foster and maintain employees’ motivation by offering 
incentive contracts (Frey and Osterloh, 2002). In turn, motivated employees put in a greater effort to produce more 
valuable results, such as increased work performance (Thomas, 2000). We therefore propose that: 
Proposition 3a: Higher levels of incentives will lead to higher level of PM’s motivation toward an IS 
project. 
AT suggests that offering incentives to PMs will induce greater effort and performance on their side, and their 
interests will become congruent to those of the owners of the IS project (Frey and Osterloh, 2002). Specifically, we 
suggest that when incentives are awarded with the goal of delivering the system on time, within budget, and 
satisfying user’s demands, the PMs are expected to display higher motivation toward IS project tasks. We therefore 
propose that: 
Proposition 3b: Higher level of PM’s motivation will lead to more successful IS project outcomes. 
Participation 
Cotton (1993) found having employees participate in work-related activities may result in improved productivity 
and job performance. Hartwick and Barki (1994) view participation as the behavior, assignments, and activities that 
users or their representatives perform during the IS projects. Given the importance of participation in influencing an 
employee’s behavior and work performance, we include participation in our study. 
Cotton (1993) found that organizations attempt to increase employees’ participation by introducing reward systems. 
Specifically rewards increase the level of participation and lead to improved task effectiveness and performance 
(Cotton, 1993). Given the critical role of PMs in managing IS projects, it is expected that by providing incentives to 
PMs, the PMs will increase their participation in monitoring and controlling the IS projects. We therefore propose 
that: 
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Proposition 4a: Higher levels of incentives will lead to higher level of project manager’s participation 
throughout the IS project activities. 
An individual will be motivated to perform an action if the probability of success of action (their expectation 
associated with the task) is expected to be high (Griffin, 1999). Invoking AT by setting up an incentive contract, the 
owner expects the delivery of a successful IS project. Thus when PMs perceive a high probability for a successful IS 
project, they will display a higher participation throughout the project activities; hence they are more likely to 
manage and lead an IS project to successful outcomes. We therefore propose that:   
Proposition 4b: Higher levels of project manager’s participation throughout IS project activities will lead 
to more successful IS project outcomes. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Because we are concerned with PM’s behavior, several alternative methods for testing the research model were 
considered, e.g., survey, in-depth interviews, project data analysis, etc. We chose a survey instrument because it 
allows for a rich assessment of the constructs and examines the statistical testing of direct relationships in a research 
model (Grover et al., 2002). We employed a web-based survey using items from previously validated instruments in 
the IS and organizational behavior fields.  
Construct and Survey Instrument Development 
Constructs from the literature were utilized where possible. We conducted a pilot test of the instrument for clarity, 
consistency, and validity with selected users from the IS field, as well as academics and experts in the IS research 
areas  (Dinev and Hu, 2007). We identified minor issues that resulted in small changes to the final instrument.  
The Incentive construct borrowed items from constructs used in the Lambert and Larcker (1993) compensation 
measurement instrument. We measured incentives using participants’ involvement with incentive contracts, from no 
incentives to a high level of incentives. The remaining variables were captured by multiple items. The Participation 
construct was derived and measured using  the Barki and Hartwick (1994a) instrument.  The Commitment construct 
was measured by adapting research items from the instrument developed by Mowday et al. (1979). The Motivation 
and Willingness to act constructs were measured by adapting items from previously validated measurement 
instruments used in other fields (Hellman et al., 2006). The Information Systems Success construct was measured 
using items developed from Banker and Kemerer (1992). The survey items were captured using a 7-point Likert 
scale and are presented in Table 4.   
Sample Profile and Descriptive Statistics 
We targeted a cross-section of IS practitioners belonging to a national IS professionals society. We selected one of 
the society’s state branches to limit the target population size to around 500 IS professionals. The exploratory stage 
of the study targeted mainly IS project managers. The demographic profile of our respondents is presented in Table 
1. 
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Type Category Distribution (%) 
Position Project Manager 41.7 
Other 23.3 
Project Leader 15.5 
IT Manager Programmer 11.7 
Systems Manager 7.8 
Industry Government Agencies 21.4 
IS/IT Consulting 19.4 
Transportation, Communication, and Utilities 14.6 
Education 9.7 
Finance, banking, and Insurance 8.7 
Mining 8.7 
Wholesale and Retail 7.8 
Other 3.9 
Manufacturing and Processing 1.9 
Experience with IS 
Projects 
<6 years 35.9 
6-10 years 32.0 
11-15 years 14.6 
16-20 years 8.7 
>21 years 8.7 
IS Projects Managed <6 projects 55.3 
6-10 projects 15.5 
11-15 projects 9.7 
16-20 projects 1.7 
21-25 projects 1.9 
> 26 projects 5.8 







1-5 projects 41.8 
6-10 projects 8.7 
11-25projects 3.9 
>25 projects 9.7 
 
      
Table 1. Demographic Profile of the Survey Respondents 
A total of 117 responses were collected for a response rate of approximately 20%, comparable with other similar 
surveys (Sohal and Ng, 1998).  Fourteen surveys were disqualified for lack of completeness, leaving 103 usable for 
data analysis. As we had more than 100 responses, SEM is a reliable and appropriate technique to test our model 
(Sörbom and Jöreskog, 1982). 
The demographic data were reviewed for the response bias of the population. Descriptive statistics indicate that the 
sample does not suffer from a non-response bias (Hair et al., 1998).  
Table 2 details respondents’ involvement in and perceptions of successful IS project outcomes. Note that all 
incentive-based projects were considered successful, while 80 percent of them were considered delivered on time, 
within budget, and adhering to specifications. We believe this is a first indicator that incentive-based projects are 
more efficiently and effectively managed and completed.  
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Incentive-based IS projects finished within 
budget 8.8 78.9 8.8 3.5 
Incentive-based IS projects finished on time 3.5 78.9 15.8 1.8 
Incentive-based IS projects delivered to 
specifications 1.7 82.4 10.6 5.3 
Incentive-based IS projects considered 
successful 0 84.2 10.5 5.3 
* Based on 57 incentive-based projects 
 
     
Table 2: Respondents’ Involvement in Incentive-Based Projects 
Results and Analyses 
We used LISREL, a Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) technique (Sörbom and Jöreskog, 1982) in two stages to: 
1) assess the reliability and validity of the measurement model using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), and  2) 
assess the structural relationships of our model using Path Analysis. Our initial results indicated the need for a 
further stage in our analysis, that is, to re-specify and develop a second order CFA model (Fornell and Larcker, 
1981). 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics and actual range of the items used in this study. We checked the sample for 
existence of outliers and multicollinearity. No extreme cases were identified and a certain degree of multicollinearity 
is required in factor analysis, hence data did not display any anomalies (Hair et al., 1998).  
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Construct Survey Item Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Cronbach’s α 
Commitment 
COMM1 4.30 1.35 -0.10 0.42 
0.61 COMM2 4.55 1.27 -0.24 0.62 
COMM3 4.82 1.43 -0.39 0.41 
Incentive 
INCENT 2.43 1.90 1.04 -0.10 1 
Motivation 
MOT1 4.77 1.31 -0.66 1.34 
0.84 
MOT2 4.67 1.38 -0.63 0.64 
MOT3 4.88 1.57 -0.69 0.26 
MOT4 4.63 1.48 -0.10 0.42 
Participation 
PART1 4.14 1.39 -0.38 0.87 
0.90 
PART2 4.09 1.25 -0.60 1.06 
PART3 4.77 1.50 -0.62 0.21 
PART4 4.55 1.34 -0.45 0.89 
PART5 4.57 1.31 -0.65 1.09 
IS Success 
SUC1 3.99 1.28 -0.61 0.61 
0.91 SUC2 3.74 1.28 0.10 0.52 
SUC3 4.27 1.11 -0.73 1.75 
Willingness to 
Act 
WILL1 4.67 1.16 -0.13 1.45 
0.85 
WILL2 4.56 1.07 -0.17 1.99 
WILL3 4.65 1.27 -0.64 1.40 
WILL4 4.87 1.43 -0.57 0.64 
WILL5 4.69 1.28 -0.64 1.33 
 
  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Survey Items 
Due to the SEM sensitivity to sample size and departures from normality chi-square per degrees of freedom (χ
2
/d.f.) 
is a more appropriate measure of a model fit. Chin (1998) recommends a ratio of χ
2
/d.f. below 3:1. SEM provides 
three additional measures of model fit (GFI, AGFI, and Standardized RMR). The thresholds for a good overall 
model fit in IS research are above 0.90 for GFI, above 0.80 for AGFI, and below 0.05 for Standardized RMR (Chin, 
1998).   
Measurement Model Validation 
We conducted a CFA of the original model comprising of 5 factors and 21 items (see Table 3). The original 
measurement model results showed a poor goodness of fit based on the above-mentioned threshold values for IS 
field (GFI = 0.635 and AGFI = 0.535).  
Consistent with SEM techniques, we re-specified and re-estimated the model after we  inspected carefully  the 
modification indices and the residuals (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). As a result, six items were discarded from 
further analysis, resulting in a revised model with 5 factors and 15 items (see Table 3).  
The statistical results are detailed in the following sections, including all the required validity checks. The revised 
model and its items are presented in Table 4 showing the 5-factor solution. We start by addressing the validity 
checks in Table 4 and then briefly discuss the model goodness of fit.   
The content validity of the new model needed to be established. The fact that all t-tests were statistically significant 
showed that all indicator variables provided good measures to their respective construct. With a GFI of 0.90 or 
above, all constructs are deemed unidimensional, hence they are reliable and valid (Sörbom and Jöreskog, 1982). 
Raduescu et al.                                                                                The Influence of Incentives on Project Managers’ Drive and 
Participation 
 
eProceedings of the 3rd International Research Workshop on Information Technology Project Management (IRWITPM), Paris, 
France, December 12th– 13th, 2008 
 
Further, all scales have a NFI of 0.90 or above, hence they have strong convergent validity and the model fits the 
underlying data well.  
To test the discriminant validity, CFA was performed on a selected pair of scales, allowing for correlation between 
the two constructs. Checks on every pair of the five scales were performed, some of these tests showed chi-square 
differences statistically significant at p≤0.01. This result displays unsatisfactory separation of the 3 major constructs. 
We observed high correlations (see Table 4) between three of the factors in the model; that is, between Motivation, 
Willingness, and Commitment. 
 Motivation Willingness to Act Commitment 
Motivation 1.000   
Willingness to Act 0.969 1.000  
Commitment  0.919 0.912 1.000 
 
   Table 5: First Order Factors Correlations 
The existence of high correlations between the factors suggests they measure the same higher-level structure or 
thing. Hence we introduced a higher-order factor (also known as second-order) model (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). 
We suggest that a second order factor consisting of Motivation, Willingness, and Commitment may exist.  Due to 
space limitation below we only discuss the second order factor model.  
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Suc1 Was/would the total cost of the project be more or less than the initial estimate? 0.94 11.73 
0.88 
Suc2 Was/would the actual duration of the project be more or less than the initial estimate? 0.82 9.926 
Suc3 Overall, was/would the final version of the project be completed with more or less than initial 




Mot1 I felt/would feel more enthusiastic to work on the project. 0.91 11.605 
0.83 






Will1 Did/would you lead the team more or less successfully towards project's objectives? 0.84 10.203 
0.84 
Will2 Did/would you contribute more or less to effective communication with all team-members 
during system development/implementation? 
0.72 8.223 
Will3 Did/would you monitor more or less closely team-members’ performance during system 
development/implementation? 
0.7 7.948 





Comm1 I felt/would feel more comfort and freedom working on the project. 0.71 7.913 
0.76 




Part1 Your responsibility for estimating development costs of the IS project was/would be? 0.8 7.587 
0.86 Part2 Your responsibility for the success of the IS project was/would be? 0.77 12.65 
Part3 Your responsibility for the development of project was/would be? 0.69 9.082 





Table 4: Survey Items Used in Final Analysis and Construct Composite Reliability
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Second-Order Factor Model 
All residuals indicated that the Success 3 item shows very large residuals, potential common variance, and the lowest loading 
on its factor. Therefore the Success 3 item was discarded from further analysis, suggesting that it shares common variance 
with Success 1 and 2. The Success 3 item, measuring “the degree of initial specifications completeness,” was considered not 
an appropriate measure of project success. .   
Goodness of 
Fit Measures 
RMR GFI AGFI NFI NNFI CFI RMSEA χ2/d.f. 
IS Threshold 






0.062 0.892 0.788 0.892 0.887 0.928 0.118 2.42 
Structural 
(SEM) Model 
0.071 0.885 0.802 0.888 0.901 0.929 0.112 2.28 
 
                                    Table 6: Second Order CFA and SEM Goodness of Fit Indices 
We conducted a second-order CFA resulting in a new 3-factor structure (see Figure 2 and Table 6 for factor loadings). As 
noted, three of the first-order factors are actually sub-dimensions of a broader and more encompassing construct.  
 
 
Figure 2: Second Order Factor Structural (SEM) Model (including loadings) 
We turned out attention to the literature and found that Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) examined how to understand and predict 
behavior. According to the theory of reasoned action (TRA), the immediate determinant of a person’s behavior is the 
person’s intention to perform that behavior. The person’s behavioral intentions are in turn said to be determined by the 
person’s attitude and intentions concerning the behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). Intentions are viewed as antecedent of 
active behavior, more specifically participation. Further, we found that Aladwani et al. (2000) viewed reward schemes as an 
intervention mechanism of some antecedent variables, i.e., intentions.   
The three constructs that comprise the new factor seem to represent behavioral intentions, while participation is the actual 
active behavior. We can therefore suggest that if PMs display high levels of behavioral intentions, they will display higher 
participation in IS project tasks. We labeled the new factor “Drive.”   
We viewed “Drive” as an appropriate higher level construct with the overall meaning of “a motivating instinctual need, 
intention or desire, or effort determination leading to an affective state (Oxford Dictionary).” We developed the new 
construct “Drive” using a summated scales approach (average of item values in the scale) for the three original constructs, 
i.e., motivation, willingness, and commitment (Hair et al., 1998).   
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We tested the new model and all validity checks were within satisfactory limits. The new structural model produced a better 
overall goodness of fit; with all indices close to the recommended IS guidelines, as indicated in Figure 2 and Table 6.  
In the new re-specified model all parameters were found significant except the path from Incentive to the new composite 
construct Drive and from Drive to Success. P4a was supported, as well as the expected impact of Drive to Participation. The 
overall conclusion is that the new underlying construct Drive is neither influenced directly by incentives, nor influencing 
directly IS success. However, Drive influences directly Participation. In other words, higher motivation, willingness to act, 
and commitment together as behavioral intentions lead to higher participation, which together with influence from Incentives 
leads to a higher rate of IS success.  
We found that Success 3, the adherence to specifications, shares a high variance with the other two items of Success. We 
conclude that “meeting specifications” is somewhat problematic in IS development. We can further suggest that “on time” 
and “within budget” criteria for successful IS project outcomes impact on the “degree to which specifications” are met.  We 
believe that because specifications are often changed during the development and implementation of an IS, measuring such a 
construct at one point in time does not reflect the changing nature over the entire period of time. If a project is finished on 
time or within budget it might be at the cost of functionality. Consequently we deemed the item inappropriate for inclusion in 
the final model.   
DISCUSSION 
Our model for testing the appropriateness and applicability of AT to the IS field found that participation was clearly 
influenced by incentives, as opposed to motivation, willingness to act, and commitment. Therefore we conclude that AT is 
applicable in the context of IS project management.  
By undertaking a second order factor analysis, we suggest that our new construct “Drive” influences participation and can be 
considered or perceived as an antecedent of participation.  Specifically, “Drive” is a more complex construct and embodies 
“behavioral intentions” as opposed to participation which is the “active” behavior. “Drive” further implies an element of 
“thoroughness” that seeks to continue the active behavior until a result is obtained. The implications are that IS managers 
must be determined to initially develop their intentions to participate, leading subsequently to their active participation until 
the result is obtained (successful IS project outcomes).   
The lack of support for P1a may be explained by the type of incentives applied, financial verses non-financial incentives. 
Meyer and Allen found commitment was higher among employees who have been promoted, a non-financial incentive 
(Meyer and Allen, 1997). Because financial incentives were the most common incentive type in our study, this may explain 
the result in our analysis.   
We did not find direct support for P2a; hence suggesting that PMs are not keen to dedicate more of their resources toward an 
incentive-based IS project. It follows that PMs do not perceive that incentives would impact on their project-related activities 
that can lead to successful IS projects.   
Surprisingly, we did not find that motivation is directly influenced by incentives. Since our respondents were predominantly 
involved in financial incentive schemes, they are therefore not fulfilling the profile of “income maximisers.” Prior literature 
found that IS professionals are mainly “achievers,” thus motivated by non-financial incentives rather than financial ones 
(Trittmann et al., 2000). This might explain the lack of support for P3a.  To solve this dilemma, in the light of our and prior 
research, other explanations should be sought in future research projects. 
We found that P4b, higher participation leads to higher IS success, is strongly supported as indicated in Figure 2.  We believe 
this is an important finding, because it partially supports the applicability of the AT in the IS field. AT is therefore supported 
for the participation construct. Willingness to act, commitment, and motivation failed to support the applicability of AT 
without influencing individually IS success in the context of this research. Our results lead to the conclusion that higher 
commitment, higher willingness to act in favor of an IS project did not directly lead to improved IS project success. 
However, together as behavioral intentions, they could lead to higher participation, which in turn lead to higher IS project 
outcomes. Further research is needed to support or validate the full applicability of AT in IS.   
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
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There are certain limitations of the study that may also inform a number of potential avenues for future research. In our 
research external validity is limited by the relatively small sample size used in this study. Care should be taken with 
generalizing to the entire IS managers population as our sample is not fully representative of the PM population. he 
instrument should also be further tested and validated because we discarded certain items from analysis.   
We would also like to acknowledge that this research did not aim to provide either an optimal incentive package that could 
ensure a successful IS project, nor determine what type of incentives should be used to motivate PMs to better perform and 
lead to successful IS project outcomes. Because our research was more exploratory in nature, we view the limitations as 
appropriate avenues for further research.   
CONCLUSIONS 
In this study we investigated the relevance and applicability of AT to the IS field. Specifically, we explored: 1) the 
relationship between the use of incentives and IS project managers’ behavior; and 2) the relationship between PM’s behavior 
and IS project success.  
First, our theoretical contribution is the development of a model to apply AT to the IS field. The contribution emanates from 
our findings that PMs’ participation in IS projects is positively influenced by an incentive-based project contract. High levels 
of participation in IS project-related activities were associated with high levels of IS project success. We also found that 
“Drive” played an antecedent role by increasing the level of participation in IS project activities, without being directly 
influenced by incentives. Second, by using SEM techniques in our analysis, we supported the view of introducing higher 
order constructs that cannot be directly measured and achieve an improvement in the overall fit of the research model.  
From a practical perspective, we suggest that organizations should consider increasing PMs’ participation by increasing their 
“Drive,” i.e., their motivation, commitment, and willingness to act. AT principles could be applied to better manage projects 
in line with management expectations. Psychometric testing could help identify individuals that exhibit strong drive 
tendencies and they could be nurtured into a PM training program. Consequently, organizations should be in a better position 
to manage their IS projects, by increasing the rate of successful IS project outcomes, thus avoiding additional costs associated 
with IS project failures and/or overruns.   
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